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SOME ANALYTICALLY SOLVABLE PROBLEMS OF THE
MEAN-FIELD GAMES THEORY
SERGEY I. NIKULIN, OLGA S. ROZANOVA
Abstract. We study the mean field games equations [1], consisting of
the coupled Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations. The equations are complemented by initial and terminal
conditions. It is shown that with some specific choice of data, this
problem can be reduced to solving a quadratically nonlinear system of
ODEs. This situation occurs naturally in economic applications. As
an example, the problem of forming an investors opinion on an asset is
considered.
1. Introduction
The theory of Mean field games (MFG) studies the models with a large
number of small components (agents) that interact with each other achieving
their individual objectives. The term ”mean field” means that the strategy
of each agent to achieve the maximum of its individual utility directly de-
pends on the average distribution of influences of other agents and does not
depend on the initial configuration of the system. The mean field theory
is well known in statistical physics, but similar concepts related to active
objects [1], [2] were formulated only in the last decade. These concepts,
together with the optimal control theory, have made it possible to study
models in economics and sociology. Now MFG are widely used in areas
requiring analysis of differential games with a large number of participants.
Here is a heuristic derivation of MFG equations, following [1]. More
details can be found in [3]. Let us assume that averaged behavior of the
agents is described by Ito stochastic process Xs ∈ R that is given as
dXs = αs ds+ δ dWs, Xt = x, (1)
where x ∈ R is a point in the space of the states, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T , Ws is
a standard Brownian motion, δ is a positive constant, αs is a parameter,
choosing the value of which from a given Borel set U ⊂ R at any time
s, one can control the process Xs (the stochastic process αs = α(s,Xs) is
an admissible Markov control). Fixing x, we mark trajectory for a specific
agent.
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The problem of control is to define maximum over all the admissible
controls αt of the expresssion
J(t, x;αt) = E
[∫ T
t
F (s,Xs;αs)ds+K(XT )
]
,
where F : R+ × R × U → R and K : R → R are prescribed continuous
functions and the process Xs obeys (1).
Let us consider the payoff function Φ : R+ × R as
Φ(t, x) = sup
α∈U
J(t, x;α).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation which allows to solve the problem
above is (see [4] )
sup
α∈U
(
F (t, x;α) +
(
LαΦ
)
(t, x)
)
= 0, (2)
where (
LαΦ
)
=
∂Φ
∂t
+ α
∂Φ
∂x
+
δ2
2
∂2Φ
∂x2
,
with the terminal condition
Φ(T, x) = K(x).
We denote the probability density of process (1) as m(t, x).
In what follows, we consider a particular case
F (s,Xs;α) = −α
2
2
+ g(m(s,Xs), s,Xs).
Thus, we assume that each agent receives a penalty for changing its position
in the phase space and seeks to maximize its individual utility function,
based on the fact that he knows only the distribution of the other agents.
The choice of the function g depends on the type of problem.
Based on the specific form of the quality function F , we obtain from (2)
∂tΦ+ sup
α
(
α∂xΦ− 1
2
α2
)
+ g(m, t, x) +
δ2
2
∂2xxΦ = 0.
Thus, if initially the density function m(t, x) is known, we get the follow-
ing initial-terminal problem for coupled Hamilton-Jacobi and Kolmogorov-
Fokker-Planck equations (x ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ]):
∂tΦ+
1
2
(∂xΦ)
2 +
δ2
2
∂2xxΦ = −g, (3)
∂tm+ ∂x(m∂xΦ) =
δ2
2
∂2xxm, (4)
m(0, x) = m0(x), Φ(x, T ) = K(x). (5)
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It is known that under certain natural assumptions (boundedness and Lips-
chitz continuity of g and K) problem (3)–(5) has only one classical solution
(Φ,m) [5].
The aim of this work is
1. To show that for some choice of g and K the solution of problem
(3)–(5) can be reduced to the solution of a system of Riccati equations.
2. To show that waiving the requirement of boundedness of g and K, we
can construct an example of nonexistence of solution to (3)–(5).
3. To show that the position of the maximum of density m(t, x) can be
analytically found even though it is impossible to find solution of (3)–(5)
for all time interval [0, T ].
4. To give an example of economic problem where g and K have a form
that allows to find a solution using the Riccati equations.
2. Reduction to Riccati equations
First of all, we note that from a mathematical point of view, it is inter-
esting to analyze the function g, which depends on m, because in this case
the equations (3) and (4) turn out to be linked. However, from the point of
view of applications, the presence of m in the utility function of agents is
not critical. Indeed, if g(m) increases then this means that it is beneficial
for agents to stay closer to the maximum of m. However, the presence of
the term −α22 already means that agents tend to resemble each other, this
creates movement in the same direction.
Therefore, we consider a simpler case when g depends only on x. We
need it for applications below. We could, without prejudice to the method,
add the term lnm to g (which was done in [6]), however, for the sake of
simplicity, we refuse this.
We also could consider a multidimensional analog of the problem (x ∈ Rn)
via reducing the problem to the Riccati matrix equations. However, the
analysis of the obtained equations is a separate difficult problem and we
strive to get the simplest model.
2.1. Gaussian distribution. Let m0(x) = Me
− (x−x0)
2
λ , where λ > 0, and
M > 0 is the normalization constant. Let also g = ax2 + bx + c, where
a, b, c are arbitrary constants. We look for a solution to system (3), (4) in
the form
Φ = A(t)x2 +B(t)x+C(t), m = eK2(t)x
2+K1(t)x+K0(t),
which imposes the terminal condition K(x) = ATx
2 + BTx + CT , with
constants AT , BT , CT .
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Substitution into the system and equating the coefficients at the same
powers of x gives the following set of equations:
A
′
+ 2A2 = −a (6)
B
′
+ 2AB = −b, (7)
C
′
+ δ2A2 +
B2
2
= −c,
K
′
2 + 4AK2 − 2δ2K22 = 0, (8)
K
′
1 + 2AK1 − 2δ2K1K2 + 2BK2 = 0, (9)
K
′
0 + 2A+BK1 −
δ2
2
(K21 + 2K2) = 0.
The initial-terminal conditions are the following:
K2(0) = − 1
λ
, K1(0) = −2x0
λ
, K0(0) = −x
2
0
λ
+ lnM,
A(T ) = AT , B(T ) = BT , C(T ) = CT .
First, we note that equation (6) which can be elementary solved under the
terminal condition A(T ) = AT is separated from the system and determines
its dynamics. Indeed, knowing A, we find K2 from (8). Then we can find
all the remaining functions. It is easy to calculate that the solution is given
by the following formulae:
• at a < 0:
A(t) = −k− (AT − k−)e
2
√
−2a(T−t) + (AT + k−)
(AT − k−)e2
√
−2a(T−t) − (AT + k−)
, k− =
√
−a
2
, (10)
• at a = 0:
A(t) =
AT
1− (T − t)AT , (11)
• at a > 0:
A(t) =
1
k+
tan
(
arctan
(
k+AT
)
+
√
2a(T − t)
)
, k+ =
√
a
2
. (12)
Analyzing (10) and (11), it is easy to see that for a ≤ 0 the solution with
terminal condition AT < k− exists for t ∈ [0, T ] for all T > 0, while for
a > 0 the solution with any terminal condition AT can exist only for T <
1√
2a
(pi2 − arctan (k+AT )). When a ≤ 0 and AT > k− the solution also does
not exist for all T .
In fact, these examples show that problem (3) – (5) can be unsolvable for
all T for unbounded g and K.
Further, we note that the position of maximum of m(t, x), ), which can
be found as Q = − K12K2 , can be described by equation
Q
′
= −K
′
1K2 −K
′
2K1
2K22
.
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Using (8), (9), we get
Q
′
= 2QA+B, (13)
and
Q
′′
= −2aQ− b.
Thus, the position of maximum either experiences fluctuations (at a > 0), or
tends to reach a certain constant value outside boundary layers near t = 0
and t = T . We know the initial condition Q(0), while to determine the
second constant of integration it is necessary to use explicit expressions for
A and B.
Note that the function B can be found as a solution to the corresponding
linear equations and written in elementary functions, but in a very cumber-
some way, while the dynamics of Q is very simple.
Let us analyze the qualitative behavior of the solution of (6), (7), (13)
with boundary conditions
A(T ) = AT , B(T ) = BT , Q(0) = Q0.
First, we note that for a < 0 the solution of system (6), (7), has a stable
equilibrium A∗ = −k−, B∗ = − b2A∗ , to which the solution converges ex-
ponentially under any terminal conditions ensuring the continuation of the
solution on the entire semi-axis (−∞, T ] . Therefore, if T is large enough,
then the solution of (13) outside the boundary layers near t = 0 and t = T
differs little from Q∗ = − B∗2A∗ = − b2a . We will give pictures for specific data
in the next section when we analyze an economical problem.
Let us note that the function Q can be found for all T , although it sat-
isfies a linear first-order equation, the coefficients of which can become un-
bounded. For a = 0 , the form Q is the simplest:
Q(t) = −1
2
bt2 +
T (ATT − 1)b−BT
2ATT − 1 t+
2AT (T − t)− 1
2ATT − 1 Q0.
We can see that the formula is also defined for positive AT , the only restric-
tion is the condition AT 6= 12T . In this case, the position of the maximum has
no limit as T →∞ and with an increase in T , the maximum of m deviates
unboundedly from its initial position.
If a > 0, the position of maximum is described as follows:
Q(t) = − b
2a
+ (Q0 +
b
2a
) cos(
√
2at) + c1 sin(
√
2at),
where
c1 =
1
2
√
a cos θ
[
(b+ 2aQ0) sin(θ) +
b− aBT√
A2T + k
2
+
sgn(cos θ)
]
,
θ = arctan
(AT
k+
)
+
√
2aT.
The position of the maximum of density varies periodically around − b2a .
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For a < 0 the solution is
Q(t) =
e2k−t
(AT − k−)e4k−T − (AT + k−)
(
Q0F1 +
BT
2
F2 +
b
8k2−
F3
)
,
where Fi = Fi(t, k−, AT , i = 1, 2, 3 are functions which do not have singu-
larities, specifically,
F1 = ((AT + k−) + (AT − k−)e4k−(T−t)), F2 = (e−4k−t − 1)e2k−T ,
F3 = (1− e−2k−t)
[
(1 + e−2k−t)((AT − k−) + (AT + k−)e2k−T )
−2(e2k−(T−t)(AT − k−) + (AT + k−))
]
.
2.2. Distribution on the semi-axis [0,∞). Letm0(x) =Mxe−κ2 x2 , where
κ > 0, and M = κ is the normalization constant. For the solution of (3) to
be symmetric about zero along the entire axis, we require
g = ax2 + c,
where a, c are arbitrary constants. We find a solution to system (3), (4) in
the form
Φ = A(t)x2 + C(t), m = xe−
K2(t)
2
x2+K0(t), (14)
with the terminal condition K(x(T )) = ATx
2+CT , with constants AT , CT .
In fact, we are looking for a solution to (3), (4) with the boundary condition
∂xΦ|x=0 = m|x=0 = 0.
Substituting (14) in (3), (4) gives the following system:
A
′
+ 2A2 = −a, (15)
C
′
+ δ2A2 = −c,
K
′
2 + 4AK2 + δ
2K22 = 0,
K
′
0 + 4A+ 3
δ2
2
K2 = 0.
The initial-terminal conditions have the following form
K2(0) = κ, K0(0) = lnM, A(T ) = AT , C(T ) = CT .
The maximum of density m is at the point Q(t) = 1√
K2(t)
. It is easy to
calculate that the position of the maximum satisfies the following Bernoulli
equation:
Q′ = 2AQ+
δ2
2Q
, (16)
where A can be found according (10), (11) and (12). The system (15), (16)
has the first integral
(a+ 2A2(t))Q2 + δ2A = const,
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which allows to express Q from A, specifically:
Q(t) =
(
(a+ 2A2(0))Q2(0) − δ2(A(t)−A(0))
a+ 2A2(t)
) 1
2
, (17)
where Q(0) = κ−1/2. From (17) we can find that, as in Sec.2.1, the function
Q(t) does not have singularities inside the interval [0, T ], even if A(t) goes
to infinity. In these points Q tends to zero. If a < 0, then for large T the
maximum of density m(t, ξ) is close to the equilibrium Q∗ = δ
4
√
k−
.
3. An example of application of the mean field game theory:
forming the opinion of investors about the asset
We give an example showing that the solutions found in the previous
section have natural applications in the field of financial mathematics. To
do this, consider a market in which a large number of investors operate,
managing their own portfolio of securities, consisting of a risky asset and a
deposit, by solving the Merton problem [7].
3.1. Individual strategy. Let us retell the statement of the problem, which
each investor solves individually, following [6], Example 11.2.5.
The price of the risky asset S1 is described by the stochastic differential
equation
dS1 = µS1dt+ σS1dWt, (18)
where Wt is the standard Wiener process µ = const, σ = const > 0. In the
economic context, these values are commonly called the drift parameter and
the volatility parameter, respectively. The price of the risk-free asset S2 is
determined only by a constant interest rate r:
dS2 = rS2dt.
Suppose that the investor operates the portfolio V , which consists of risky
and risk-free assets, with h1 and h2 being the shares of capital invested in
risk and risk-free assets, respectively, h1 + h2 = 1. Then
dV
V
= h1
dS1
S1
+ h2
dS2
S2
.
Let us denote h1 = h, h2 = 1− h. The change in the value of the portfolio
has the following form::
dV = (r + (µ− r)h)V dt+ σhV dWt. (19)
Assume that starting with capital Vt = v > 0 at the time t, the investor
wants to maximize the expected return on capital at some subsequent point
of time T > t. If we set the utility function N(V ), which is usually assumed
to be increasing and convex upward, then the problem reduces to finding
the function Φ(t, v) and the Markov control h∗ = h∗(t, V ), such that
Φ(t, v) = sup
h
{Jh(t, v)} = Jh∗(t, v),
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where h is the Markov control, Jh(t, v) = Et,v[N(V hT )]. In order to solve this
problem we should define a differential operator
Lhf = ∂f
∂t
+ (µh+ r(1− h))v ∂f
∂v
+
1
2
σ2h2v2
∂2f
∂v2
and solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
sup
h
{(LhΦ)(t, v)} = 0, t ∈ (0, T ), v > 0, (20)
Φ(T, v) = N(v), Φ(t, 0) = N(0), t < T.
If ∂vΦ > 0 and ∂
2
vvΦ < 0, then the solution is h(t, v) =
(µ−r)∂vΦ
vσ2∂2vvΦ
. Substitut-
ing this expression in (20) gives the following boundary value problem for
Φ:
∂tΦ+ rv∂vΦ− (µ− r)∂vΦ
2σ2∂2vvΦ
= 0, t ∈ (0, T ), v > 0, (21)
Φ(t, v) = N(v), t = T or v = 0.
As a utility function we take N(v) = v
q
q , q < 1, q 6= 0, or N(v) = ln v.
The latter function formally corresponds to the limit q → 0. All these
functions belong to the class HARA (hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) [8].
In addition, the case q < 0 corresponds to the strategy of the investor
who prefers the least risky investments, q = 0 corresponds to risk-neutral
strategies, q > 0 corresponds to the risk-prone investor [9], Sec.2.
The solution (21) can be found in the form Φ(t, v) = φ(t)N(v), the cor-
responding optimal strategy at all q < 1 is
h∗ =
(µ− r)
σ2(1− q) . (22)
Let us calculate the capital growth rate E
lnV
t
, that investor will receive
guided by the optimal strategy (22). From (19) and Ito’s formula:
d lnV =
[
(µh+ r(1− h)) − 1
2
σ2h2
]
dt+ σhdWt,
for all q < 1
E
lnV
t
= r +
(1− 2q)(µ − r)2
2σ2(q − 1)2 .
This, in particular, implies that strategies for investing in risky assets with
q > 12 (very risky investors) lead to a decrease in portfolio returns.
3.2. Collective strategy. Now let us describe the collective behavior of
investors. We assume that they all manage the portfolio based on their own
ideas about the parameters (drift and volatility parameters) of the risk asset.
In other words, each fixed investor carries out control based on the equation
(18) with its own choice of µ and σ. The true values of these parameters
(we denote them by µ¯ and σ¯) are unknown to investors. These true values
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may differ from those accepted in the market, and they manifest themselves
only in that the investor receives a penalty for their incorrect choice.
It is believed that the opinions of investors about the correct value of
the drift parameter µ are distributed normally along the entire axis, the
maximum is initially at µ0.
The volatility σ obeys some positive distribution and its density initially
has a maximum at some point σ0 > 0. At the same time, investors receive a
penalty both for deviating from the ”true” values of the drift and volatility
parameters, and for deviating from the majority opinion. A significant sim-
plification that stems from the desire to obtain an analytical solution to the
problem is the assumption that all investors treat risk the same way, guided
by the same utility function N(v).
During the control process, the initial distributions of drift and volatility
parameters change with the desire to maximize capital growth rate.
We will be interested in how the position of the distribution maximum
m(t, x) changes in response to the control method, that is, how the market
is forming an opinion about the parameters of a risky asset.
We obtain a typical optimization problem of the theory of mean-field
games (3), when the random variables µ or φ(σ) play the role of X, subor-
dinate to (1), K(X(T )) = lnV (T )T , and
g(t,X,m) = β
lnV (X)
t
− γη(X, x¯) + λ ln m(t,X)
µ∗(t)
,
β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, x¯ = const, φ(σ) is some smooth function of volatility, η
is a function simulating penalty for an investor who incorrectly guesses the
parameters of the risky asset. It is chosen for reasons of convenience, for
example, η(X, x¯) = (X − x¯)2. The presence of the function ln mµ∗ ≤ 0, where
µ∗(t) > 0 is the value of the maximum of density m(t, x) at a fixed time t
models a penalty for deviating the opinion of a investor about a risky asset
from the majority opinion. As we have already noted, the first term under
the integral in (3) serves the same purpose. Moreover, it can be analytically
shown that the equation describing the position of the distribution maximum
does not change if we assume λ > 0, the presence of this term will only
lead to a more pronounced maximum, which is also confirmed by numerical
analysis. Therefore, below we assume λ = 0. The coefficients β and γ can
be considered equal to zero or not, depending on what problems we are
studying.
As application of the results of the previous sections, we consider two
separate cases. In the first of them, we suppose that the volatility of a risky
asset is known and an opinion is formed regarding its drift. In the second,
on the contrary, the drift parameter is considered known, and an opinion is
formed about volatility.
3.3. The opinion about the parameter of drift µ. So, we assume that
the volatility σ is fixed, η = (µ − µ¯)2. The system of equations (3)–(5) has
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the following form:
∂tΦ+
1
2
(∂µΦ)
2 +
δ2
2
∂2µµΦ = −β(r +R(µ− r)2) + γ(µ − µ¯)2, (23)
∂tm+ ∂µ(m∂µΦ)− δ
2
2
∂2µµm = 0,
Φ(µ, T ) = r +R(µ− r)2, m(µ, 0) = 1√
piλ
e−
(µ−µ0)
2
λ , (24)
where R = (1−2q)
2σ2(q−1)2 .
Thus, in the notation of Sec.2.1
a = βR− γ, b = 2(γµ¯ − βRr), c = βr + βRr2 − γµ¯2,
K2(0) = − 1
λ
, K1(0) = −2µ0
λ
, K0(0) = −µ
2
0
λ
+ ln
1√
piλ
,
AT = R, BT = −2Rr, CT = r +Rr2.
According to the results of Sec.2.1, the solution of (23)–(24) exists for all
T > 0, if and only if βR− γ < 0 and R <
√
γ−βR
2 . However, the position of
the maximum of m(t, µ) can always be determined. Namely, if βR− γ < 0
(a < 0), then for large T the position of maximum is close to
Q∗ =
rβR− γµ¯
βR− γ .
In other words, in this case, investors form an opinion about the asset.
If βR − γ > 0 (a > 0), then the maximum of m oscillates periodically,
sometimes deviating significantly from its average value. The frequency of
these oscillations increases with a. In this case, we say that investors cannot
agree on the parameters of asset.
Let us analyze this result from the point of view of the agent’s behavior
when investing for a long period of time.
• If R < 0, that is, investors adhere to a rather risky strategy (q > 12),
then the market forms the opinion about the correct value of µ, even
if γ = 0. In the threshold case q → 1 most investors believe that
the correct return on a risky asset is close to the risk-free rate of the
asset and avoid investing in a risky asset. If q → 12 , then, otherwise,
the opinion tends to the ”true” value of µ.
• If R > 0, that is, the investors are rather cautious (q < 12 ), then
– without the presence of a penalty for the wrong choice of µ an
opinion on the return of the asset does not form.
– If β = 0 or γ is sufficiently large, then Q∗ is close to the ”true”
value µ = µ¯.
– The similar effect has an unlimited increase of σ or |q|, since
lim
σ→+∞
R = lim
q→−∞
R = 0.
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In other words, very cautious investors quickly form the correct
opinion about the asset, and this the faster, the greater the
volatility.
• Since lim
σ→0
R = ∞, the smaller the randomness component in the
value of the risky asset, the more difficult it is for investors to come
to a common opinion about it. Indeed, to ensure the condition
βR − γ < 0 for a fixed q, so we should choose a large value of γ.
This situation seems paradoxical, but can be explained as follows:
if the investor is dealing with a low-risk asset, then he is inclined to
adhere to a more risky strategy, that is, choose a larger q. It is easy
to see that if q = 12 − o(σ2), then R tends to zero, which helps to
determine the correct value of µ.
The typical behavior of the maximum of density m(t, µ) is represented on
Fig.3.3.
Figure 1. The position of maximum of µ for q = −10, σ =
0.5, β = 1, µ¯ = 0.5, r = 0.1 at values γ = 0, 1, 2 (marked by
numbers). Q0 = 0.2. With increase of γ the maximum tends
to the correct value, with a tendency to overestimate.
3.4. Opinion on volatility σ. Now suppose that the parameter µ of the
asset is known, and the agents make their assumptions regarding volatility.
Unlike the previous problem, we cannot assume that σ is distributed on
the entire axis and we should consider some positive distribution of it. In
order to be able to obtain an analytical solution, we consider instead of σ
the quantity ξ = 1σ , which at the initial moment of time has the density
m0(ξ) = κξe
−κ
2
ξ2 with a maximum at ξ0 =
1
σ0
= 1√
κ
and use the results of
Sec.2.2. Due to the fact that the function g must be even in ξ, we cannot
choose η such as in Sec.3.3. Instead, we assume that η(ξ, ξ¯) = ξ2, that is,
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the investor receives a penalty for choosing ξ too large (or σ too small),
formally ξ¯ = 0. We emphasize that we change the problem for the sake of
the ability to get an exact solution.
The problem (3)–(5) has the following form
∂tΦ+
1
2
(∂ξΦ)
2 +
δ2
2
∂2ξξΦ = −β(r + Pξ2) + γξ2,
∂tm+ ∂ξ(m∂ξu)− δ
2
2
∂2ξξm = 0,
Φ(ξ, T ) = r + Pξ2, m(ξ, 0) =
1
ξ20
ξe
− 1
2ξ20
ξ2
,
where P = (1−2q)(µ−r)
2
2(q−1)2 . In notation of Sec.2.2
a = βP − γ, c = βr,
K2(0) =
1
ξ20
, K0(0) = ln
1
ξ20
, AT = P, CT = r.
Let us make conclusions about the behavior of the maximum of m(t, ξ),
which which follow from the results of Sec.2.2.
• If we assume that γ = 0, β > 0 then for large T the maximum Q∗
is close to a constant if and only if P < 0, that is q > 12 . This
constant is equal to δ√−8P . We associate this behavior with forming
an opinion on the volatility of a risky asset. The solution reaches a
constant, the faster, the greater the difference µ− r. If δ decreases,
the value of Q∗ tends to zero. This means that the maximum of
m(t, σ) tends to infinity, that is, the risky asset is perceived as more
uncertain.
• If γ ≥ 0 and P > 0, then the opinion on volatility is formed under
the condition βP − γ < 0. For large T the maximum Q∗ is close to
a constant equal to δ√
8(γ−βP )
.
• If βP−γ > 0, then the position of the maximum of m(t, σ) oscillates
with a frequency that grows with βP − γ.
At a qualitative level, the situation is identical to that described
in Sec. 3.3.
4. Conclusion
We consider a simple application of the theory of mean field games to
study the behavior of market agents managing a portfolio of securities which
consist of risky and risk-free assets, based on a utility function that is com-
mon to all. We assume that the information on the market is incomplete,
that is, agents are forced to independently decide on the parameters of the
risky asset. When setting problems, we limit ourselves to the possibility of
obtaining its analytical solution.
SOME ANALYTICALLY SOLVABLE PROBLEMS OF MEAN-FIELD GAMES 13
We deal with two separate situations. In the first one, agents know the
exact value of volatility parameter, but decide on the correct value of the
drift parameter. When agents manage their portfolio, they get a penalty for
a false assumption of the ”true” value of the drift parameter. In the second
case, on the contrary, the value of the drift parameter is known, however,
agents receive a penalty for considering volatility too small. We study the
question of whether, under the conditions described, the market formed an
opinion about parameters of the asset, and if so, how far is it from the
correct one.
The model that can be extended in different directions. In particular,
it is natural to assume that agents have to choose three parameters at the
same time: the drift and volatility of the asset, as well as risk attitude.
Such problem can also be solved within the framework of the mean-field
games theory, however, it is three-dimensional in space and does not allow
an analytical solution. However, it can be investigated numerically.
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